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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University1 (GRC) exemplifies a rare 
breed of judicial opinion: one that has become a proverbial canary in a coal mine. 
It presaged what is emerging as the dominant question related to state regulation 
of sexuality for the next decade: the tension between lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) equality claims and claims to religious liberty.  
In GRC, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled both that a Roman Catholic 
university had to provide equal material benefits to gay student organizations, and 
that those organizations could be required to declare on stationery and in 
publications that the university did not endorse their activities. By doing so, the 
court granted victory to Georgetown University on expressive grounds and to the 
Gay Rights Coalition on equality grounds. In the end, both parties claimed 
victory.2  
It is tempting to attribute this Solomonic and seemingly happy ending to 
the court’s deft accommodation of the two worldviews represented in the case. 
The decision exemplifies reliance on pluralism as the central lodestar for 
∗ Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987). 
2 A Gay Rights Victory at Georgetown, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1988, at A7, col. 1.  
 
                                                 
 navigating factionalism in the modern democratic state. The court built its 
resolution on an amicus brief from a Wisconsin civil rights agency that had 
suggested the specific compromise,3 adding an elaborate doctrinal path to reach 
its result. The decision has become something of a poster child for judicial 
minimalism: a model of wisdom, pragmatism, and statesmanship.4  
The opinion in GRC was the first by a court of last resort to establish 
parameters for accommodating religious belief in the context of enforcing civil 
rights protections for gay plaintiffs. It will not, however, be the last. Today the 
volume of sexual orientation equality claims has dramatically increased. When 
the complaint in the Georgetown case was filed in 1979, the District of Columbia 
was the only state-level jurisdiction that prohibited anti-gay discrimination.5 
When the case was decided nine years later, only Wisconsin had joined D.C. in 
banning sexual orientation discrimination.6 Today, antidiscrimination laws in 
twenty one states plus the District of Columbia contain this prohibition.7 
Since GRC was decided, additional cases have arisen testing the 
accommodation of religious beliefs in the context of gay rights claims.8 In a case 
3 Brief for the Governor’s Council on Lesbian and Gay Issues as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellants, Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(No. 
5863-80). 
4 William Eskridge has been the leading scholarly voice in describing the GRC decision as 
exemplary for its pluralism-friendly mode of adjudication. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge and 
Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 707, 750 (1991); William N. Eskridge, A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: 
Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 
YALE L.J. 2411, 2433–34, 2437, 2449–51 (1997). 
5 Gay Rights Coal., 536 A.2d at 33. 
6 See STATE OF WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, FAIR EMPLOYMENT, 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION, AND WORKER PROTECTION LAWS IN WISCONSIN, available at 
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/pubs/ib/08IB1.pdf (Wisconsin banned anti-gay discrimination in 
1982); see also Anti-Discrimination Law in Massachusetts, GAY AND LESBIAN ADVOCATES AND 
DEFENDERS, http://www.glad.org/rights/massachusetts/c/anti-discrimination-law-in-massachusetts 
(Massachusetts was the next state to act; it banned anti-gay discrimination in 1989).   
7 Non-Discrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, 
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
8 See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
1787 (2014); Catholic Charities of Me., Inc. v. City of Portland, 304 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D. Me. 
2004); EEOC v. Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 216 F. Supp. 2d 763 (S.D. Ind. 2002); Doe v. California 
Lutheran High School Ass’n, 170 Cal. App. 4th 828 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); Egan v. Hamline United 
                                                 
in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari, a New Mexico retail photographic 
services business was found in violation of that state’s antidiscrimination law 
after its refusal to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony.9 In a different 
context, the Court has found that a for-profit business can assert a religious liberty 
claim.10 Several disputes related to employees of religious schools and service 
providers for weddings are in various stages of litigation.11 
In the legislative arena as well, religious liberty concerns have 
increasingly surfaced as the primary area of dispute in the enactment of LGBT 
equality legislation. In the Senate’s passage of legislation prohibiting sexual 
orientation and gender identity discrimination in 2013, the only floor amendment 
Methodist Church, 679 N.W.2d 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp 
Meeting Ass’n, O.A.L. Dkt. No. CRT 6145-09 (Jan. 12, 2012) (holding that a Methodist 
organization that rented its facilities to the public could not distinguish between same-sex and 
different-sex ceremonies). In 2011, a state trial court judge upheld the decision by an Illinois 
agency to terminate its contract for foster care services with Catholic Charities because of 
discrimination against same-sex couples seeking to adopt. Manya Brachear, Catholic Charities 
Loses Ruling on Foster Care, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 19, 2011. The group declined to appeal 
and ended its role in foster care. Manya Brachear, Catholic Dioceses Dropping Lawsuit over 
Foster Care, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 14, 2011. The Catholic Charities foster care and adoption 
agency in Boston also withdrew from providing the service rather than agree to accept same-sex 
couples as parents. Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions: Gay Issue 
Stirred Move by Agency, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2006.  Cf. Levin v. Yeshiva University, 96 
N.Y.2d 484 (2002) (finding that a religiously-affiliated university’s policy of limiting certain 
housing to married students violated a municipal antidiscrimination law because of its disparate 
impact on same-sex couples). However, Yeshiva did not assert a Free Exercise or other religiously 
grounded defense. See generally, Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: 
Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 
53 B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1438–39 (2012). 
9 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 53. 
10 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
11 See Edith Honan, Gay-Marriage Debate Takes New Twist in Oregon: Religious Exemption, 
REUTERS, Feb. 2, 2014 (describing current disputes in several states involving bakeries and florists 
that refused to provide services for same-sex weddings); Michael Paulson, Gay Marriages 
Confront Catholic School Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2014, at A1 (describing “a wave of firings 
and forced resignations of gay men and lesbians from Roman Catholic institutions across the 
country”). 
                                                                                                                                     
 adopted concerned exemptions for religiously-affiliated employers.12 In state 
legislatures, bills extending marriage rights to same-sex couples have often 
triggered debate over the breadth of protection from liability for entities with 
various degrees of religious affiliation.13  
One reason for the increased focus on exemptions from antidiscrimination 
mandates is that the facial constitutionality of such exemptions is uncertain. They 
can fall into a gray zone between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment 
Clause, neither necessary nor impermissible.14 Their absence does not 
significantly burden the beliefs or practices of those who adhere to various faiths, 
and they are not required by the Free Exercise Clause. Neither are they 
necessarily prohibited by the Establishment Clause, because they generally do not 
favor one religion over another, although they may favor religion over non-
religion. The precise location of where an exemption crosses the line in either 
direction remains unclear. 
The cultural intensity associated with disputes like those surrounding 
homosexuality and religion illustrates the virtues of judicial restraint and of 
adjudication on the narrowest possible grounds. While minimalism in the service 
of pluralist accommodation can be a powerful virtue, these mechanisms for 
defusing conflict come at a cost. As Jed Purdy as written, pluralism in practice 
can seem “like riding a glass-bottomed boat over the colorful shoals of human 
values,”15 but courts do not have the luxury of pleasure cruising merely to see the 
sights. Nor does it make sense to embark on every voyage with only the vaguest 
map from those who have gone before. 
12 Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Approves Ban on Antigay Bias in Workplace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 
2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/08/us/politics/senate-moves-to-final-vote-on-
workplace-gay-bias-ban.html. 
13 Wilson, supra note 8, at 1429. Voters in Oregon may be the first to consider separate ballot 
initiatives: one to legalize same-sex marriage and another to create an exemption for businesses to 
decline services on religious grounds. Honan, supra note 11. 
14 Corporation of the Presiding Bishops of the Church of Jesus of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 334–35 (1987). 
15 Jedidiah Purdy, Some Pluralism About Pluralism: A Comment on Hanoch Dagan’s “Pluralism 
and Perfectionism in Private Law,” 113 COLUMBIA L. REV. SIDEBAR 9, 10 (2013), 
http://columbialawreview.org/some-pluralism-about-pluralism-a-comment-on-hanoch-dagans-
pluralism-and-perfectionism-in-private-law/. 
 
                                                 
The GRC litigation was a particularly turbulent outing over those shoals, 
and it offers lessons for contemporary debates. The D.C. court’s opinion also 
provides an apt beginning point for situating current LGBT equality versus 
religious liberty debates in a broader set of questions concerning the role of courts 
in navigating treacherous cultural terrain. This article re-examines the GRC 
decision with these two goals in mind and explores how it illuminates deficiencies 
in both doctrine and political theory.  
The article is divided roughly in half between analysis of doctrine and of 
theory. I first critique the GRC decision doctrinally, focusing on the court’s 
grappling with the expressive components of the two identities and the 
uncertainties surrounding the distinction between recognition and endorsement. 
GRC was a particularly challenging dispute to resolve because of the then-new 
shifts in social meaning—that is, perceptions of the causes, consequences and 
normative valence of certain beliefs and conduct—that confronted the court at 
several levels of its analysis. I then update its analysis by examining how the 
Supreme Court in the years since GRC has dealt with the same doctrinal 
questions, identifying the inadequacies that remain. From there, I analyze a series 
of more theoretical problems that lay beneath the surface of a pluralist and 
minimalist approach to judging, including the proper role of courts, the 
problematic social meaning of antidiscrimination law, and the indeterminacy of 
both pluralist and religious belief systems.  
More specifically, the order is as follows: In Part II, I tell the story of the 
GRC case and explain why it resonates so closely with current and likely future 
cases involving the conflict between gay equality and religious liberty. Simply 
put, three distinct dynamics converge in this category of cases: 
• A conflict between two groups or representative parties driven by 
strong belief systems; 
• A factual context in which questions of sexual morality are central; 
and 
• A legal framework of antidiscrimination statutes. 
These factors tend to trigger emotional responses that impede a proper weighing 
of the interests in contestation. Their cultural volatility also obscures the evolving 
social meanings that attach to each one of the three, thus greatly complicating the 
adjudicatory function. Disaggregating these points of tension is the first step in 
understanding the complex doctrinal mechanics in cases like GRC. 
  I criticize the GRC court for its too-easy acceptance of the University’s 
argument that its capacity to communicate adherence to Roman Catholic tenets on 
homosexuality would be irreparably spoiled by the presence of a gay student 
group. The court based its finding that the University violated the D.C. 
antidiscrimination law on evidence that the school’s spoliation argument was 
tainted by stereotyping the student group as necessarily asserting support for 
every position in an imagined “gay agenda,” including hostility to religion.16 This 
finding effectively limited the holding to the particular facts of the case. Where 
the court fell short, I argue, was in its failure to impose a duty on the larger, more 
powerful expressive actor to mitigate any harm to its message by assuming the 
burden to dissociate itself from the student group by engaging in more speech. 
  Part III explores cases in which the Supreme Court has confronted the 
central questions present in GRC since that case was decided. I focus on two 
themes. The first is whether an expressive institution’s tolerance of the presence 
of an actor with a contrary message that contradicts the institutional speaker’s 
message constitutes endorsement by the institution of that actor. Second, I trace 
how the Court has grappled with the inseparability of a status characteristic and a 
related expressive message.  
 I conclude that the law on both points remains unclear, but that it is also in 
motion. The Court has both deferred too easily to an expressive institution’s 
spoliation argument (repeating the mistake in GRC),17 and, more recently, insisted 
on a duty to mitigate expressive harm by dissociation.18 When presented with an 
argument that lesbian, gay, or bisexual status, implicated by an antidiscrimination 
rule covering sexual orientation, could be separated from beliefs about the 
morality of homosexual conduct, the Court rejected the proposition that the two 
could be readily distinguished.19 Yet the Justices have not analyzed, or even fully 
engaged with, the complexities of expressive identity-based conflicts. 
Part IV builds on the doctrinal analysis in Parts II and III and begins the 
shift to a more theoretical orientation. In Part IV, I argue for a substantial 
modification of the weight given to minimalist adjudication techniques—the 
“passive virtues” —that have garnered widespread support by scholars 
16 Gay Rights Coal. v. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
17 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
18 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
19 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
                                                 
commenting on the judicial role in the culture wars. I propose three interpretive 
guidelines for lawmakers and lower courts confronted with conflicting normative 
visions: a default principle that civil obedience is ideologically neutral; a lodestar 
of enhancing voice and discouraging exit; and a commitment to protecting the 
right to dissent from the antidiscrimination principle.  
In Part V, I explore the social meaning of antidiscrimination laws, the 
third problematic conceptual theme in GRC and one that is almost as culturally 
dense and contested in its meanings as are the concepts of religion and sexuality. 
Courts have upheld civil rights laws as viewpoint-neutral regulations of conduct 
rather than expressions of belief, but this understanding runs counter to a massive 
amount of descriptive commentary, as well as the history and popular discourse of 
civil rights. The moralistic vision of antidiscrimination law has persisted, even as 
civil rights laws have expanded to encompass issues directly related to sexuality. 
This combination draws demands from religious groups for exemptions, including 
Georgetown in the GRC litigation, on the theory that enforcement of LGBT 
equality laws creates unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination against 
conservative religious beliefs. The need for civil rights advocates to mobilize a 
rhetoric other than moral legitimacy has gone unacknowledged, and I argue that 
this should become a component of antidiscrimination discourse for the future. 
Finally, Part VI interrogates the underlying concept of pluralism. I identify 
how two inconsistent models using the same nomenclature of pluralism have 
emerged in Free Exercise scholarship. I critique the newer model, which I 
characterize as based on the concept of “state as player,” under which a truncated 
state takes a back seat to expansive individualist rights to accommodation of 
religious beliefs and practices. I endorse the state-as-umpire model, both because 
it supplies the necessary resolution in a cosmopolitan democracy and because it is 
the only approach that can effectively protect against the third-party harm that 
results from exemptions. 
Issues related to sexuality constitute a primary site for the negotiation of 
pluralist values and challenges to those values. The epistemic dynamic is mutually 
constitutive. Specifically, conflicts surrounding equality rights for openly gay 
persons will redefine the cultural authority and social role of religious institutions, 
as they simultaneously affect the meaning of equality.  
 
II.  THE GEORGETOWN “GAY RIGHTS CASE”: THE PERFECT STORM 
 
 In 1978, lesbian, gay and bisexual student groups on the main campus and 
at the Law Center of Georgetown University sought recognition as official student 
groups. When the University refused, the student groups filed suit under the D.C. 
Human Rights Law, which had been amended three years earlier to prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by public accommodations, 
including educational institutions.20 The University took the position that it could 
not accede to the D.C. law without acquiescing to coerced speech. It argued that 
granting official recognition to the gay student groups would communicate the 
University’s endorsement of homosexuality, contrary to Catholic teaching.21  
When GRC reached the D.C. Court of Appeals, there was no precedent in 
the context of LGBT equality for resolving the tension between the nation’s dual 
commitments to equality of persons and tolerance for ideological dispute. In the 
plurality decision written by Judge Julia Cooper Mack, the D.C. Court of Appeals 
ruled that Georgetown University had to comply with D.C.’s prohibition by 
furnishing equal material, but not philosophical, support to gay student 
organizations.22 The court thus split the atom of tolerance, separating what it 
described as the material from the expressive components of the 
antidiscrimination mandate. 
The complexity of the issues produced a complex resolution, consisting of 
seven separate opinions in the final en banc decision, preceded by majority and 
dissenting opinions from a three-judge panel.23 Three components of the dispute 
converged to produce a particularly intense legal and social conflict. First, the 
dispute required adjudicating between two nomic identity communities, each of 
which had plausible legal claims. Second, the context of the dispute trenched on 
the particularly volatile cluster of social meanings surrounding homosexuality.24 
Finally, the doctrinal framework in which the dispute arose was 
antidiscrimination law, a body of law that is itself not simply a mechanism for 
determining liability, but is also deeply inflected with suggestions of moral 
20 Gay Rights Coal., 536 A.2d at 10–14. 
21 Id. at 11–14. 
22 Id. at 39. 
23 496 A.2d 567 (D.C. 1985), rev’d en banc, 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987).  
24 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 198 (1994) (“What made 
Gay Rights Coalition a hard case was that one social construction (‘homosexuals’ as sick, 
immoral, or pathetic people) was giving way to another one (lesbians, gay men and bisexuals as a 
minority against whom discrimination is unjustifiable).”).  
                                                 
legitimacy. In a reflection of the importance to it of the principles involved, the 
University sacrificed $200 million in tax-exempt bonds that the District declined 
to offer while Georgetown was resisting enforcement of the antidiscrimination 
statute.25 Ultimately, the University President and Board of Directors acceded to 
the court’s ruling despite pressure from counsel and Cardinal James Hickey to 
seek further review in the Supreme Court.26 
Had any of these factors not been present, the emotional intensity register 
of this litigation would have been significantly lower.  Even had the dispute been 
between the same two parties, for example, it would have not become an epic 
saga lasting a decade and achieving widespread notoriety if the context had been 
questions of scientific accuracy or if the legal framework had centered on contract 
or torts. Instead, a trifecta of cultural crisis points melded into a perfect storm.  It 
is a storm that is likely to arise again.  
The Georgetown case is conventionally— and not incorrectly —
understood as a battle of rights in which the liberty of religious expression and 
belief was pitted against equality claims. A better understanding, however, is that 
it was a battle of social meanings, or perhaps the first skirmish in one specific, 
continuing battle.  Explicitly at issue in the framing of the parties’ claims and 
defenses, and in the text of the opinion, were the meanings of the act of 
compliance with an antidiscrimination law, of openly expressed homosexuality, 
and of the distinction between endorsement and toleration. What is missing from 
Judge Mack’s opinion is a deeper engagement with these social meanings and 
their legal and social consequences.   
 
A. The Role of Expressive Identity in the Georgetown Case 
 
In a dispute that pits claims of equality against those of religious liberty, 
the equality claims may arise from the Equal Protection Clause or from civil 
rights statutes. The religiously-affiliated defendant can disavow liability based on 
some or all of three branches of First Amendment law: free expression, the 
freedom of expressive association, and the free exercise of religion. The tests that 
25 Walter J. Walsh, The Fearful Symmetry of Gay Rights, Religious Freedom, and Racial Equality, 
40 HOW. L. J. 513, 566–67 (1997). 
26 Id. at 564–66; Daniel Klaidman, ‘Insulting and Intimidating’: Williams & Connolly’s Tactics 
Are the Central Issue in the Battle Over Legal Fees in Georgetown Case, LEGAL TIMES, June 20, 
1988, at 7, 10. 
                                                 
 a court must deploy to apply those defenses collapse into each other.27 In each, 
the court must determine whether enforcement of the equality claim would 
significantly burden the defendant’s expression or religious beliefs or the capacity 
of an organizational defendant to associate for expressive purposes. If a burden is 
significant, the court must then assess whether there is a compelling state interest 
in enforcing the equality mandate and whether its interest could be achieved with 
comparable effectiveness by other means. The weight of the burden on the 
speaker determines how great the obligation is on the state to justify its action. 
State action that produces either silencing or coerced speech is generally per se 
invalid. 
This analytic construct structures the dispute in unfortunate ways. It 
assigns equality interests to one party and expressive liberty interests to the other, 
when it is almost always true that both sides embody both values. The “equality 
plaintiff” is in fact communicating a message, and the “expressive defendant” is 
seeking recognition for the cluster of identity affiliations that produced the point 
of view it seeks to advance. Despite this complex social dynamic, constitutional 
doctrine has artificially disaggregated the speaker and the message – a 
nonsensical result in light of the way that social life is experienced. 
In earlier work, I have described how what I have called the concept of 
expressive identity—the social reality of integration between the identity of the 
speaker and the viewpoint of her message–has cut across doctrines and confused 
constitutional law.28 Both protecting a group of people in a marginalized status 
category from discrimination and fostering space for anti-orthodoxy messages 
should be understood as part of the same project of furthering justice. Thus, if an 
expressive identity—such as “gay” or “Christian”—is to be protected, the scope 
of the equality protection for each group must include space for incorporating the 
intrinsic message behind the group identity, rather than allowing the message of 
either group (whether it is “gay is good” or “homosexual conduct is a sin”) to 
negate the equality mandate. 
The anomalies of legal doctrine that underlie the expressive identity 
conundrum have produced contradictory framings by gay plaintiffs.29 In First 
27 Cf. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985–86 (2010). 
28 Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 1 (2000). 
29 Id. at 30–31. 
                                                 
Amendment cases against state actors, LGBT plaintiffs have pressed claims 
premised on dissent, with self-characterizations of LGBT identity as inherently 
expressive. In situations such as the Georgetown case, involving private sector 
defendants, LGBT plaintiffs have downplayed any expressive self-
characterizations. In that type of case, the clearer the anti-orthodoxy viewpoint of 
the group of LGBT plaintiffs, the stronger the defense by a private institution that 
it cannot be dragooned into endorsement of ideas with which it disagrees.  
 
The conundrum of expressive identity fractured the en banc court in GRC.  
Because GRC involved a private university, the students had no First Amendment 
claim and the University had no First Amendment obligation. What the 
Georgetown students did have was the District of Columbia antidiscrimination 
statute.  Two judges asserted that the student groups represented a viewpoint 
regarding the moral legitimacy of homosexuality, and that the local civil rights 
law did not require Georgetown to treat all belief-driven groups equally.30 Judge 
Mack rejected this argument on the ground that the University had applied anti-
LGBT stereotypes in its rationale for non-recognition of the groups, thus placing 
its policy into the category of status-based discrimination.31 Without that 
evidence, however, the group’s intrinsic “pro-gay” message could have defeated 
its claim under the antidiscrimination law. By extension, other openly LGBT 
persons and organizations could have been left unprotected against exclusions by 
private entities with an expressive function, as indeed later occurred with the Boy 
Scouts.32  
Two other members of the court found that the expressive components of 
openly lesbian, gay, and bisexual identity had to be accepted as part of the 
equality claim, thus implicitly recognizing and endorsing the expressive identity 
critique.33 These judges considered it bogus for Georgetown to claim that its 
differential treatment of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual students could be separated 
from the very kind of bias that the antidiscrimination law was enacted to prohibit. 
30 536 A.2d at 65–66 (en banc) (Belson & Nebeker, JJ).  
31 Id. at 27–29. The court concluded that Georgetown “ascribed to the student groups only 
‘purposes and activities’ which they may have had, but also a host of others automatically 
assumed to be a necessary attribute of their homosexual orientation.” Id. at 28. 
32 Boy Scouts of Am v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
33 Id. at 56–60 (Ferren & Terry, JJ). 
                                                 
 Based on the evidence of stereotyping, Judge Mack’s opinion elided the 
conflict about whether the claim of the LGBT equality organization was better 
understood as challenging a private institution’s hostility to gay students or as 
challenging the institution’s protected right to express antipathy to the idea that 
homosexuality should be a neutral factor in its operating policies. This elision 
enabled the court to avoid taking a position on whether the foundation of the gay 
students group’s claim was status or viewpoint. The court thereby ducked the 
question of the social meaning of toleration of contrary expression by a speaker 
with a sincere objection to a particular form of equality. The court achieved a 
compromise between competing normative visions only by avoiding the meaning 
of those visions.  
 The conceptual frame of expressive identity seeks to engage head-on with 
these anomalies. It incorporates these complexities by recognizing that the 
identity characteristic that grounds any equality claim is in fact an amalgam of 
status, expression, and often conduct. Religious affiliation and sexual orientation 
are perhaps the two clearest examples of such an amalgam: each characteristic 
melds a social demographic, a set of practices and, as Justice Kennedy described 
religion, “a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of 
subjects may be discussed and considered.”34 The conceptual frame of expressive 
identity thus integrates the expressive aspects of any antidiscrimination claim as 
intrinsic to, rather than contradictory to, equality norms. In doing so, it offers a 
realistic appreciation that recognition claims are intrinsically communicative of 
ideas and beliefs.  
The Supreme Court has noted the risk that pretextual claims of shared 
beliefs by an association could hide discriminatory policies of excluding certain 
persons.35 Assessing the sincerity of a group’s expressive function can be tricky. 
In general, I would accord wide latitude for all expressive associations, including 
those of a religious nature, but I would not eliminate the judicial role of guarding 
against exemptions that are based on suspiciously recent central beliefs from 
antidiscrimination laws. As the number of such cases increases, the need increases 
for greater clarity of analysis as well, something the Court has not yet achieved. 
34 Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995). 
35 530 U.S. at 653 (stating that “an expressive association can[not] erect a shield against 
antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a particular 
group would impair its message”). 
                                                 
 
B. Conflicting Views of “Endorsement”  
 
 Baked into the problem of expressive identity is the contention that when 
an institution allows the presence of certain expressive actors, such as openly gay 
plaintiffs or groups, it is reasonable to infer that the institution has endorsed some 
variation of the belief that homosexuality is morally or socially acceptable.  In the 
Georgetown case, the University rested its First Amendment defenses most 
heavily on the argument that recognition of the gay student organizations would 
be “interpreted by many” as an endorsement of homosexuality by the 
University.36  Georgetown thus alleged a burden on its expression rights because 
of what it asserted was the social meaning of recognizing the gay student groups.  
 The claim by Georgetown and similar institutions that their own 
expressive messages have been hijacked and twisted amounts to a spoliation 
defense—that is, that its religious position on homosexuality is spoiled by the 
presence of an openly gay student group on campus.  My argument, in response, 
is two-fold.  First, I agree that the first part of a proper doctrinal response is to 
employ an objective test of whether there has been spoliation of the speaker’s 
message.  I recognize, however, that objectivity is easier said than done; in a 
culturally-loaded context such as that in the GRC litigation, objectivity can seem 
like a chimera. Second, I argue that changing social meanings result in changing 
the degree of burden on expression (even under a properly objective test) and that 
this reality must be taken into account in the doctrinal analysis.  
In her analysis for the D.C. Court of Appeals, Judge Mack eschewed 
objectivity. Instead, her opinion deferred to the University on gauging the 
expressive impact dynamics in the case. Not only did Judge Mack’s opinion 
accept the University’s understanding of the content of Roman Catholic tenets on 
the subject of homosexuality, as it should have, but it also deferred to the 
University’s argument that recognition of a student organization would inevitably 
communicate endorsement of the activities and beliefs of that student 
organization.37 In the University’s view, being required to recognize a gay student 
group, while otherwise taking no position on the group, was equivalent to 
36 536 A.2d at 11, 13. 
37 The panel had rejected this option. Gay Rights Coal. v. Georgetown Univ., 496 A.2d 567, 574 
(D.C. 1985). 
                                                 
 mandated neutrality by the University regarding the group, which was in turn 
equivalent to endorsement of the group and hence, of homosexuality. Expert 
testimony by clergy advanced this argument as part of Roman Catholic doctrine.38 
The University further argued that it would be seen as having endorsed not only 
the campus activities, but also whatever movement efforts and messages 
emanated from the entire gay rights movement beyond the campus.39   
The court’s acceptance of this analysis led to the conclusion that the D.C. 
statute could not require the University to recognize the gay student groups 
without violating the University’s First Amendment right against coerced 
speech.40  In effect, the court defined a particular religious constituency as the 
relevant metric for determining the effect of compliance with a civil rights law, 
rather than the presumptively secular publics of the student body, the faculty, and 
neutral observers. The result was a fundamentally subjective analysis. 
The court accepted this analysis without significant assessment of the 
reality of the University. Georgetown University is not a congregation or religious 
order, but a large university that has chosen to function in a national, secular 
academic environment. It does not limit the faculty, staff or student body by 
religious affiliation or adherence to tenets of the Roman Catholic faith. It is a full 
and flourishing member of the intellectual and economic marketplace of higher 
education. Central to the role of even private universities is their uniquely broad 
openness to all manner of viewpoints. 
It is easy to criticize the finding of an endorsement effect from the 
perspective of twenty-five years later, all the more so in light of Georgetown’s 
own changes.41 But, a defender of the decision for its pluralist value might argue, 
meanings shift; the social meanings of ideas are not frozen. Surely there is no 
better example of that than debates over equality rights for lesbians and gay men. 
Gay identity signifies an issue and a group that was once seen as “beyond the 
38 536 A.2d at 15. 
39 Id. at 13, 29–30. 
40 Id. at 21. 
41 See, e.g., Kyle Spencer, A Rainbow Over Catholic Colleges: How Georgetown Became a Gay-
Friendly Campus, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 30, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/education/edlife/how-georgetown-became-a-gay-friendly-
campus.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
                                                 
pale,” 42 but gay equality now harmonizes with civil rights more generally, with 
increasing success in the political arena. Only two years before the en banc 
decision, the Supreme Court ruled that same-sex partners had no constitutionally 
protected right to sexual privacy.43 Perhaps the contention that gay presence 
implied endorsement, however strained now, was at least plausibly right then.  
Even if we assume for purposes of argument that the court was correct to 
accept Georgetown’s claim that the presence of a gay student group might create 
the perception that the University endorsed homosexuality or gay rights, the court 
should not have stopped its analysis there.  First Amendment law requires an 
inquiry into whether the speaker whose message is allegedly being coerced 
nonetheless has the power to eliminate the distortion of its views by affirmative 
dis-attribution—i.e., by taking steps to communicate its non-endorsement of 
certain messages, in ways that will reasonably counter any false perceptions of 
agreement.44 
 
The duty to mitigate spoliation of one’s message by dissociation from the 
spoiler provides courts with a mechanism for allocating the burdens of tolerance 
and dissent in a dispute over expressive space. As cultural shifts alter the 
perception of endorsement, the burden of disassociation will become lighter.  
 In GRC, the appellate panel and the en banc court parted ways at this step 
of the analysis.45 The panel had accepted, arguendo, Georgetown’s fear of a 
perception of endorsement, but had concluded that there were many mechanisms 
available to the University for distancing itself from a gay student group and 
clarifying that it did not accept the group’s message.46  Such actions, the panel 
reasoned, would mitigate any burden on the University’s First Amendment rights. 
The en banc court resolved the endorsement/dissociation question in 
precisely the opposite way.  Unlike the panel, the en banc court accepted the trial 
court’s factual finding that the spoliation of the University’s message by the gay 
42 Gay Students Org. of Univ. of N. H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1974) (“The 
underlying question, usually not articulated, is whether, whatever may be Supreme Court 
precedent in the First Amendment area, group activity promoting values so far beyond the pale of 
the wider community's values is also beyond the boundaries of the First Amendment.”). 
43 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186 (1986). 
44 See infra text accompanying notes 64–67.  
45 Compare 536 A.2d at 19 (en banc) with 496 A.2d at 574 (panel). 
46 496 A.2d at 580. 
                                                 
 student group was irreparable.47  For that reason, Judge Mack’s opinion for the en 
banc court concluded that Georgetown did not need to recognize the student 
group, although it was required to provide the group with various material 
supports. Judge Mack’s opinion left undecided any issue of disassociation.48  
During settlement agreements following the court’s decision,49 the burden of 
dissociation eventually came to rest on the student groups, requiring the groups to 
state affirmatively that, despite their use of the name “Georgetown,” there was no 
official university recognition of the groups.50 
 The GRC court’s treatment of both prongs of the relevant doctrine was 
inadequate: it gave short shrift to the need for an objective standard for assessing 
whether there is perceived endorsement when a university recognizes a student 
group, and it failed to address a duty of mitigation on the part of the university.   
In the end, the D.C. court developed its own approach to the allocation of 
discursive space, but without articulating a coherent rationale to assist courts in 
later cases. 
 
C. The Role of Antidiscrimination Law in GRC 
  
 What no doubt astounded Georgetown University and its lawyers in the 
1980’s was that their position condemning homosexual conduct, grounded in 
clear religious doctrine, was seen as only morally equivalent – rather than morally 
superior—to the implicit normative premise of a statute that forbade differential 
treatment based on sexual orientation. In its ultimate resolution of the conflict, the 
D.C. Court of Appeals in effect granted that the University had a moral autonomy 
right to take a normatively wrong position, but held that the antidiscrimination 
law constrained the University from imposing material harm as a result of its 
position.51 
47 536 A.2d at 19. The en banc court declined to review this finding de novo, instead ruling that it 
was not clearly erroneous. Id. The University’s contention was heavily muddied by its 
simultaneous acceptance of other student groups with messages contradicting Roman Catholic 
orthodoxy. 496 A.2d at 573-74. In addition, the university never sought to ban gay student groups 
from campus entirely. Id. at 574. 
48 536 A.2d at 14 n.12; id. at 46 (Newman, J., concurring). 
49 A Gay Rights Victory at Georgetown, supra note 2.   
50 Consent Agreement (on file with author). 
51 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987). 
                                                 
The association of this cluster of moral meanings with antidiscrimination 
law forms no part of any judicial holding of which I am aware, although the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bob Jones University v. United States52 comes close. 
The Court in Bob Jones held that the public policy against racial segregation was 
so strong that it trumped the right of a conservative Christian college to maintain a 
discriminatory admissions policy based on its religious beliefs.53 Although 
multiple utilitarian arguments about the value of diversity to the quality of 
education can justify antidiscrimination requirements, it seems a stretch to 
imagine that the court would have disallowed a religion-based exception had the 
only state interest been that of encouraging high standards in university education. 
Instead, the power of the Bob Jones decision lies in its normative punch. 
In GRC, the court addressed the related question of whether the District 
had a compelling interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination. In the 
first appellate opinion, the panel held that this goal was equally “‘compelling’ or 
‘overriding’” as the interest in eliminating discrimination based on race or sex, 
and cited Bob Jones as controlling precedent for the proposition that 
antidiscrimination goals outweighed religious liberty interests.54  
 Judge Mack, the third member of the original panel, dissented from its 
judgment in part because she disagreed with this reading of Bob Jones. To her, 
“the majority’s equation” of race and sexual orientation discrimination, in light of 
the constitutional history associated with the former, was “far-fetched.”55 In her 
opinion for the full court, Judge Mack walked back the implications of her “far-
fetched” characterization in a lengthy section of the en banc opinion that recounts 
the history of discrimination based on sexual orientation. Although it describes 
such discrimination as an “evil,”56 the court acknowledged approaching this part 
of its analysis with “more than a little trepidation.”57 Except for a few passing 
references,58 the Bob Jones decision is not mentioned. 
52 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
53 Id. at 604. 
54 496 A.2d at 576.  
55 Id. at 586. 
56 536 A.2d at 32. 
57 Id. at 33. 
58 Id. at 32–33. 
                                                 
 In the dispute over comparing discrimination based on sexual orientation 
to that based on race, both sides realized that an important cultural good was at 
stake. The most valuable resource that Georgetown lost in the GRC litigation was 
not the avoidance of extending relatively insignificant material benefits to the gay 
student groups. Rather, its major loss was the exclusivity of its claim to moral 
superiority in the public sphere, a position that in turn had served to reaffirm the 
superiority of its private definition of morality. 
 
D. Summary 
 
 We have seen in this part how deeply contingent the decision in the 
Georgetown case was on social meanings in three key dimensions: the expressive 
connotations of both gay identity and religious affiliation; the contested 
interpretations of which actions communicate “endorsement” of a position or 
viewpoint; and the normative implications of a judicial finding that the university 
violated a civil rights law. 
 My critique thus far has been primarily doctrinal. Judge Mack and those 
who have celebrated the decision, however, would doubtless argue that doctrinal 
deconstruction misses the bigger points: that the court’s compromise solution 
enabled both parties to retain their dignity and fostered future dialogic 
engagement.  In the historical context of the 1980s, this assessment may be 
correct.  But we must also ask how best to protect and foster cultural diversity 
now. 
 Beginning in Part IV, infra, I will address broader questions of political 
theory raised in GRC and similar cases.  Before reaching those points, however, it 
is important to bring the doctrinal analysis up to date.  
 
III. EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE SINCE GRC  
  
 Since GRC was decided, the Supreme Court has been forced to confront 
the same three tensions present in the Georgetown case. The result has been a 
mixture of partial clarification and uneven reasoning, with patches of 
emotionalism.  
 
A. Spoliation and Endorsement 
 
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court found that the Scouts’ right to 
expressive association barred New Jersey from applying a law against sexual 
orientation discrimination in the selection of an assistant scoutmaster. 59 Although 
Dale can be read as superseding GRC, it can also be distinguished: Dale involved 
a leadership position in an organization for children and adolescents, rather than 
the presence of one among many student groups available to young adults in a 
university setting. What is consistent in both GRC, and Dale, however, is the 
courts’ avoidance of the feasibility of dis-attribution. 
The expressive association test that the Court used in Dale asked only 
what would be the burden of Dale’s presence on the Scouts’ ability to disseminate 
their chosen message. The Court deferred, in a perfunctory manner, to the Scouts’ 
assertion that it taught that homosexual conduct is morally wrong and that the 
presence of a gay assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden its expressive 
integrity.60 The primary dissent argued that the Scouts had failed to demonstrate a 
meaningful burden, both because of lack of evidence that its views on 
homosexuality were consistent and unequivocal over time and because of the 
excess significance being accorded to homosexuality.61  But neither opinion 
engaged directly the importance of assessing whether the excluder could 
effectively disassociate itself from the party seeking inclusion. The absence of 
that step in the doctrinal analysis enabled the majority’s too-easy finding of an 
unconstitutional burden. 
Thus, the dissociation point escaped analysis. All of the Justices alluded to 
changing popular opinion on homosexuality,62 but none understood why changing 
popular opinion was relevant. Justice Stevens’s references to specific indicia of 
this change seemed to be intended as a counter to, and a calling-out of, more 
conservative views as “atavistic.”63 The imprecision of his references elicited 
distancing comments from his fellow dissenters. Shifts in popular opinion did not, 
as Justice Souter’s separate dissent correctly stated, affect in any way whether the 
59 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
60 Id. at 651–52. 
61 Id. at 668-78, 696 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
62 Id. at 660, 699–700 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 701 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
63 Id. at 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
                                                 
 Scouts’ views were entitled to presumptive protection under the First 
Amendment.64  
What is important about changes in public opinion regarding LGBT 
equality is that they reflect shifts in social meaning that undercut the weight of the 
expressive burden on the Scouts. This dynamic should have been factored into the 
Court’s analysis. The Scouts asserted that including an openly gay Scoutmaster 
would create the perception that the Scouts endorsed homosexuality, the same 
argument made by Georgetown.65 This argument depends on both the assumption 
that a reasonable observer would draw that conclusion and that there were no 
effective dissociation steps that the Scouts could take to counter it.   
As homosexuality becomes more accepted in the society at large, the 
reasonable person’s interpretation of gay presence changes. The evolving 
opinions either in favor of or neutral about homosexuality do not disqualify anti-
gay opinion from First Amendment shelter. But they do affect the calculus as to 
what is a reasonable duty to mitigate by dissociation because they increase the 
likelihood that such dissociation will be effective.  To the extent that efforts to 
dissociate succeed, the spoliation of the anti-gay speaker’s message diminishes. 
For these reasons, determining who bears the burden of dissociation or 
dis-attribution in this situation is critical. For expressive harm as for material 
harm, the law should place the burden on the party with the greatest capacity to 
absorb it, generally the party having the greatest capacity to disseminate its own 
views. If there is risk that reasonable persons would perceive that X’s tolerance of 
Y’s presence signals a change in X’s worldview, then fashioning a remedy that 
requires X to generate more expression increases the articulation of both anti-
LGBT and pro-LGBT views and strengthens the norm of tolerance.  
One could object that to understand legal outcomes as turning on cultural 
changes is to invite ambiguity and judicial over-reaching. It is precisely the 
dissociation test that could alleviate that risk, however. Asking whether concrete 
mechanisms exist by which the excluder could effectively communicate its own 
views, despite an unwanted expressive identity presence, would constitute a test 
for allocating the burdens of tolerance and dissent that is far more consistent with 
norms of both equality and expression than the deference employed by the courts 
in GRC and Dale. 
64 530 U.S. at 701 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
65 Id. at 651 (majority opinion). 
                                                 
In two other cases, analogous in different ways to GRC, the Court did 
employ a dissociation test. Both involved a university that asserted spoliation of 
expression: that either funding for a student religious group or the presence of 
military recruiters would undercut the message intended by the university. In 
Rosenberger v. Univ. of Virginia, a public university argued that paying expenses 
for a Christian student publication would so distort the university’s policy of 
neutrality that it would create an Establishment Clause violation.66  In Rumsfeld v. 
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), a consortium of law 
schools challenged a statute requiring that military recruiters have equal access to 
campus placement services.67 The schools argued that compliance would undercut 
their policies against allowing entities with discriminatory employment policies to 
recruit on campus.68 In both Rosenberger and FAIR, the Court found that the 
burden on speech could be sufficiently mitigated by university efforts publicizing 
their own messages of neutrality or commitment to equality, respectively.69 
One may argue that Dale and FAIR can be distinguished from each other 
and from GRC by the particular branch of First Amendment law that was found to 
be decisive. Both the Scouts and FAIR asserted a combination of expressive 
association and coerced speech claims. The Court decided Dale on expressive 
association grounds, and FAIR on coerced speech grounds.  For some purposes, 
the two doctrines appropriately diverge. In expressive association law, and not in 
coerced speech litigation, the court must inquire as to the bona fides of the 
expressive characteristics of an organization and whether the views in contention 
have in fact been consistently, repeatedly expressed.70  For the individual or 
organization claiming that expression is being commandeered in service of a 
particular message, the history of past views is largely irrelevant. 
But both are branches of law in service of the same principles. When there 
is a conflict in rights, as there is in claims to inclusion in a venue that is itself 
communicative, the same balancing of expressive burdens should attach. The 
question of whether the impact on the message of the excluder can be mitigated 
by reasonable steps to dissociate from the intruder should factor into both 
66 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
67 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
68 547 U.S. at 68. 
69 515 U.S. at 839–41; FAIR, 547 U.S at 64–65. 
70 Cf., Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 648. 
                                                 
 analyses. The outcomes in both categories of cases should foster the purposes and 
normative values of freedom of both expression and equality.   
 
B. Untangling Expressive Identity  
 
The most recent case in which the Supreme Court has directly grappled 
with the expressive identity conundrum is Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.71 
Here, the Christian Legal Society (CLS) cast itself as the functional equivalent of 
the Boy Scouts in Boy Scouts Association v. Dale:72 a norm-driven expressive 
association that excluded persons based on the particular combination of beliefs, 
status and conduct that antidiscrimination laws have treated as sexual orientation. 
In its reasoning, the Court acknowledged the expressive aspects of conflicting 
identities more directly than it ever had before   
 In CLS, the Court considered antidiscrimination claims by a conservative 
religious student group that challenged the policy of a public university limiting 
recognition to organizations that allowed all students to participate in all 
recognized organizations. CLS argued that denying it recognition constituted a 
viewpoint-based exclusion from a limited public forum, in violation of its 
expressive association rights. CLS contended that its policy of excluding those—
including lesbian, gay, and bisexual students—who did not comport with its 
philosophy that only heterosexual intimacy within marriage could be moral 
amounted to limiting membership eligibility based on viewpoint. In any event, 
CLS argued, it did not discriminate based on the per se status of sexual 
orientation.73  
 Faced with this Boy Scouts-like argument, the Court distinguished the case 
from Dale because the right of CLS to continue its membership policies without 
recognition as a student group was not in question. CLS had other options.74 The 
majority declined to attempt to disaggregate the components of expressive 
identity. Nonetheless, the five majority Justices acknowledged that these 
71 130 S.Ct. 2971 (2010). 
72 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
73 130 S. Ct. at 2990. 
74 Id. at 2975. At issue in Dale was whether the Scouts could continue to operate in New Jersey. 
Cf., Dale, 530 U.S. at 648. 
                                                 
characteristics congealed into one meaningful concept of identity. In that, they 
were joined, albeit backhandedly, by the dissent. 
 
1. The Boy Scouts Redux Strategy 
 
 CLS is an association of law students and lawyers with chapters at a 
number of law schools. When the Hastings College of Law chapter of CLS sought 
official university recognition, it was denied on the ground that CLS violated the 
Hastings requirement that recognition would not be granted to student 
organizations that discriminated based on certain specified grounds, including 
sexual orientation. During the litigation, Hastings specified that the non-
discrimination requirement also meant that student organizations had to accept all 
students as participants, members, or leaders “regardless of their status or 
beliefs.”75  Hastings took no position on the morality of any form of sexual 
conduct. 
 CLS refused membership to anyone who disagreed with its belief that 
“sexual activity should not occur outside of marriage between a man and a 
woman . . . [including] anyone who engages in unrepentant homosexual 
conduct.”76 When its request for official student organization status was denied on 
the ground that it violated the antidiscrimination policy, CLS contended that the 
state through its public university was prohibited from penalizing CLS’s right of 
expression and association based on a requirement of equal treatment that 
conflicted with the organization’s views on sexual morality. 
 “[T]his is an a fortiori case under Dale,” CLS argued,77 citing the Scouts’ 
right to exclude Dale because his inclusion would subvert the Scouts’ right to 
express its view that homosexuality was incompatible with Scouting. Like the 
Scouts, CLS emphasized, it too based its exclusionary policy on its beliefs. 
Therefore, it could not be required to admit all comers, including those who 
manifestly disagreed with its philosophy, a group that included, but was not 
limited to, lesbian, gay, and bisexual students. CLS asserted that it could not 
75 130 S. Ct. at 3005. 
76 Id. at 2974. 
77 Brief for Petitioner at 45, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-
1371), 2010 WL 711183, at *45. 
                                                 
 effectively continue to communicate its viewpoint if it was forced to accept 
members who disagreed. 
 The Court rejected the argument. Agreeing that the “First Amendment 
shields CLS against state prohibition of the organization’s expressive activity,” 
the Court nonetheless ruled that, while the holding in Dale fell within the scope of 
that principle, the facts in CLS did not.78 At issue was not a prohibition of 
expression but the denial of a form of public subsidy. Using the all-comers policy 
as the basis for subsidy decisions was justified, the Court found, as a reasonable 
way to administer the system of student organizations. 
 
2. Hinting at Expressive Identity 
 
 The CLS litigation was complicated by a dispute over whether Hastings 
had in fact relied on an all-comers requirement to deny recognition or whether the 
denial was based on solely the antidiscrimination mandate.  If the latter, CLS 
contended that other student groups were allowed to exclude based on viewpoint, 
and that it, as a religious organization, was singled out as ineligible to control its 
membership in that way. Chief Justice Roberts was sympathetic to the 
ramifications: 
[G]ender or race is fundamentally different from 
religious [belief]. Gender and race is a status. [sic] 
Religious belief, it has to be based on the 
fundamental notion that we are not open to 
everybody. We have beliefs, you have to subscribe 
to them. And we have always regarded that as a 
good thing.79 
In the trial court, the parties had stipulated that to secure formal status, a 
student group had to allow “any student” to participate, using as an example that a 
Democratic club had to admit Republicans.80 Hastings denied the allegation that 
the all-comers policy was not being enforced or that CLS was turned down on 
other grounds.81 In the Supreme Court, however, CLS argued that the earlier 
78 130 S. Ct. at 2978. 
79 Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–47, 130 S. Ct. 2971. 
80 130 S. Ct. at 2982. 
81 Cf., 130 S. Ct. at 2995 (2010). 
                                                 
version of the policy had been applied, that prohibited discrimination but did 
apply the all-comers policy in all instances and that, in any event, both versions of 
the policy were unconstitutional. 
Based on the stipulation, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court 
analyzed only the all-comers policy, accepting that it was applied equally to all 
student groups. In response to the CLS argument that even with an accept-all-
comers policy, Hastings had a constitutional obligation to allow viewpoint-based 
exclusions for a viewpoint-based group, the Court demurred from imposing such 
a difficult enforcement task on the university. The CLS demand that “Hastings 
permit exclusion because of belief but forbid discrimination due to status . . . 
would impose on Hastings a daunting labor. How should the Law School go about 
determining whether a student organization cloaked prohibited status exclusion in 
belief-based garb?”82 
The majority opinion implied that viewpoint was inseparable from identity 
or status, at least for a religious group. The Court acknowledged the assertion by 
CLS that it did not “exclude individuals because of sexual orientation, but rather 
‘on the basis of a conjunction of conduct and the belief that the conduct is not 
wrong.’”83 In the next sentence rebutting the point, the Court substituted “status” 
for “the belief that the conduct is not wrong”: “Our decisions have declined to 
distinguish between status and conduct in this context.”84  Fairly read, the two 
sentences strongly suggest recognition that the concept of “status” encompasses a 
message that one believes that the conduct defining the status is moral. This 
precise combination constitutes expressive identity. 
Justice Stevens, in concurrence, went further and argued explicitly that the 
identity status associated with religious affiliation or homosexuality necessarily 
and correctly incorporates viewpoint.85 He more clearly recognized the category 
of expressive identity but without labeling it as such. He agreed with the main 
opinion as to the validity of the all-comers policy, but also found that Hastings 
could have enforced a ban on sexual orientation discrimination against a religious 
student group, even if other clubs were allowed to limit membership based on a 
shared philosophy. To do otherwise, he said, would eviscerate the goal of barring 
82 130 S. Ct. at 2990 (emphasis in original). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 2996 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
                                                 
 status-based discrimination: “A person’s religion often simultaneously constitutes 
or informs a status, an identity, a set of beliefs and practices, and much else 
besides. (So does sexual orientation for that matter . . .).”86 
The four dissenting Justices would have found both versions of the policy 
unconstitutional. The original policy, Justice Alito wrote, constituted viewpoint-
based discrimination because its effect was to bar only religious groups from 
excluding members who did not share their beliefs, and because it discriminated 
against groups, like CLS, that expressed a viewpoint on sexual morality not 
shared by the University.87 Implicitly, this opinion also grasped the basic truth 
behind the concept of expressive identity: that social identity is too capacious to 
be distilled into two pure categories, one status, one viewpoint. Although the 
members of the court diverged over how to apply the insight, they appear to have 
all agreed that sexual orientation and religion both exemplify this concept. 
Justice Alito concluded that, even if the viewpoint was neutral on its face, 
the all-comers policy was adopted as a pretext for discriminating against the 
religious group.88 His dissent raised the question to which we will return in Part 
IV: whether antidiscrimination policies, when enforced against religious entities 
on behalf of gay plaintiffs, are themselves the reflection of bias. Four members of 
the Court appeared ready to adopt the CLS argument that enforcement of the 
antidiscrimination policy created a disparate negative impact on religious entities 
that express a belief that homosexual conduct is morally wrong.89 
 
C. Summary 
 
The law’s treatment of expressive identity remains unclear. The Supreme 
Court has both declined to factor in the duty to dissociate when the presence of an 
equality claimant would arguably spoil the message of an expressive institution 
(Dale), and has also insisted on such a duty (FAIR). The Court has recognized the 
complexities of the combined and mutually reinforcing effects of conduct, status, 
and viewpoint. As with the ambivalent guidance regarding a duty to dissociate, 
however, it has not clarified a mode of analysis for expressive identity claims.  
86 Id. at 2996 n.1. 
87 Id. at 3011–12 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
88 Id. at 3015–17. 
89 CLS Brief at 37–39. 
                                                 
 
IV. THE ROLE OF COURTS IN A KULTURKAMPF 
 
 In the wake of backlash that is often mobilized around the theme of 
“judicial activism,” American courts and scholars have sought shelter in a 
renewed emphasis on the virtues of judicial modesty and restraint. Especially but 
not only in cases that arouse strong public reactions, there is broad agreement that 
courts should rely on a minimalist or passive approach to adjudication.90 LGBT 
equality cases provide a particularly stark challenge to judges, one that has 
literally threatened the judicial function by producing election campaigns against 
judges who have voted to legalize same-sex marriage.91  
 Judicial minimalism is the jurisprudence of pluralism, providing a buffer 
zone both for the interest groups involved and for the judges themselves. 
It functions as a philosophical speed bump, a warning that courts should proceed 
with prudence and caution when a dispute enters the field of highly contested 
religious and moral values. More deeply, the underlying goal of minimalism is to 
enhance the processes of democratic deliberation by which such issues can be 
resolved by politically accountable decision makers, outside the often zero-sum 
world of litigation.92  
Judge Mack’s opinion in GRC is a model of such minimalism. It rejected 
the all-or-nothing litigation posture of the parties in GRC, and deployed several 
standard techniques for “leaving things undecided”: emphasizing statutory rather 
than constitutional grounds, limiting the resolution to the distinctive facts of the 
particular set of circumstances, and eschewing the announcement of broad rules 
for future cases. Its result was to foster dialogic engagement between the parties: 
in fact, they negotiated a settlement agreement that embodied the principles of the 
decision. Since that time, conditions for LGBT students at Georgetown have 
greatly improved.93 
90 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT xi 
(1999) (“The current Supreme Court embraces minimalism. Indeed, judicial minimalism has been 
the most striking feature of American law in the 1990’s.”). 
91 A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html?_r=0. 
92 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 92, at 5, 24–28. 
93 See supra text accompanying notes 63–66. 
                                                 
  The value of judicial minimalism in a constitutional democracy is self-
evident but not unmixed. Moreover, “maximalism” is not the only alternative. 
Rather than broad pronouncements of principles to govern future cases, courts 
could deploy much more focused burden-shifting mechanisms. In this Part, I 
identify three broader principles that would decrease the ambiguous nature of 
minimalism-driven results without sacrificing the advantages of judicial restraint.  
The duty to dissociate discussed above is one such specific doctrinal device. 
Consider the following to be a suggestion for judicial minimalism 2.0. 
 
A. Civil Obedience 
 
 One problem circulating in the background of religious liberty defenses to 
equality claims is that changes in social meaning can and do produce changes in 
law, and thus can be decisive of legal disputes.  Neutral principles are not 
unchanging principles.  The facts in GRC illustrate it well: as we have seen, 
Georgetown asserted that its recognition of the gay students groups would have 
created the perception, at least in the minds of some, that the university endorsed 
homosexuality, thus spoiling its own message. I have suggested that this was not 
an unreasonable claim 30 years ago when the case was being litigated, although it 
would be today. I have also argued that the D. C. Court of Appeals was 
nonetheless mistaken in its analysis of endorsement because it did not explore the 
means available to the University to cure any spoliation by affirmative dis-
attribution.  
 But there is a more fundamental criticism that relates to the expressive 
functions of law. Georgetown’s argument depended on the premise that 
compliance with a law of general application sends any message at all. The 
relevant baseline question should be not whether voluntary university recognition 
would have created a perception of endorsement, but whether mandated 
compliance with a law would have created such a perception.  
  To analyze whether the extent of the burden on religion caused by 
obedience with a law is justified, courts examine the state’s interest in enacting 
the law. The Supreme Court has found that some burdens are not justified94 and 
that other burdens are overridden by the public interest served by the law.95 The 
94 See, e.g.,Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).  
95 See, e.g., Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
                                                 
problem with this analysis is that it skips an important threshold step: 
consideration of whether the acts necessary to comply with the law are expressive 
or merely instrumental. Some are expressive; some are not. I agree that individual 
religious actors may experience obeying a particular law as a burden, and I would 
not find all such burdens acceptable.  Not wearing a yarmulke when one’s faith 
demands it as a sign of respect to God,96 or being forced to work on the day one 
believes to be the Sabbath,97 are intrinsically expressive acts that generally create 
no harm to third parties. They are qualitatively different from paying income tax 
or administering a business or an institution that is a public accommodation. 
Absent a literal forcing of expression98 or coercion of specific, highly personal 
actions contrary to the religious commands of a certain faith, civil obedience is 
not the same as agreement.   
The premise that ministerial acts of civil obedience are not expressive is 
well-established. It has long been a part of the jurisprudence of antidiscrimination 
law in the context of race. Whites who resisted integration feared loss of business 
if they voluntarily desegregated because their customers might perceive them as 
agreeing with practices of racial mixing. The law that made desegregation 
compulsory protected them against that risk.99 The same understanding attached 
to arguments by a religious school that admission of African-American students 
would undercut its belief that segregation had a Scriptural basis: 
Although the school leadership’s voluntary 
enrollment of blacks might communicate such a 
message, desegregation in response to a federal 
court’s implementation of the congressional 
mandate of § 1981 would not. Much as merchants 
were freed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 from any 
fear that white customers react adversely to the 
acceptance of black business, parents and school 
leaders are freed by § 1981 from any fear that 
96 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
97 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
98 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state could not constitutionally require individual to 
display the words “Live Free or Die” on his license plate). 
99 GAVIN WRIGHT, SHARING THE PRIZE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION IN 
THE SOUTH 77, 101–02 (2013). 
                                                 
 children will interpret acceptance of blacks as an 
indication of church approval of the practice.100 
 
The school at issue in this case was typical of a much broader phenomenon. The 
number of private all-white Christian schools mushroomed in the 1960s and 
1970s in the South, a development that most observers attributed primarily to the 
effort to avoid desegregation.101 The Southern Regional Council, for example, 
stated in 1973 that “Christian schools and segregation academies are almost 
synonymous.”102 
 In those cases, courts recognized that the excess social significance of race 
should not be permitted to down the presumptive neutrality of civil obedience. In 
the vast range of business and other institutional practices, acts that are required to 
obey a neutral law send no signal as to the wisdom of that law. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby took a dangerous step back from that 
understanding.  
In Hobby Lobby, the Court held that requiring closely-held corporations to 
comply with a mandate to provide health insurance coverage for certain 
contraceptives violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act when the 
corporate owners objected to such coverage based on their religious beliefs.103 
The Court characterized its holding as “very specific” to that factual context104 
and “concerned solely with the contraceptive mandate.”105 The case presented a 
threat of “severe” economic consequences to the plaintiffs of non-compliance,106 
coupled with “precisely zero” negative impact on third parties,107 because of an 
already existing mechanism created by the government for providing exemptions 
100 Brown v. Dade Christian Schs., 556 F.2d 310, 321–22 (5th Cir. 1977) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring). 
101 JOSEPH CRESPINO, IN SEARCH OF ANOTHER COUNTRY: MISSISSIPPI AND THE CONSERVATIVE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION 248-50 (2007); DAVID NEVIN and ROBERT E. BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT 
FEAR BUILT: SEGREGATIONIST ACADEMIES IN THE SOUTH (1976). 
102 Id. at 248. 
103 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
104 Id. at 2760. 
105 Id. at 2783. 
106 Id. at 2775.  
107 Id. at 2760. 
                                                 
to nonprofit entities.108 The Court specifically disavowed “the possibility that 
discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as 
religious practice to escape legal sanction.”109  
It is too early to know whether the decision in Hobby Lobby will prove to 
be as exotic as these limitations suggest or will come to be seen as the camel’s 
nose under the tent. The limitation to race discrimination as the barrier against 
pretext is deeply disturbing at best. The excess significance of sexuality in the 
construction of definitions of morality should not so easily lead to a different 
result than in race-related cases. 
 
B. Voice, Not Exit 
 
 The second principle that should guide courts in culturally volatile cases 
such as GRC builds on the first. If obeying a generally applicable law does not 
communicate a message, an objecting individual has two options. The first option 
is voice; the second is exit. In adjudicating such disputes, judges should interpret 
doctrine and fashion remedies with the goals of fostering voice and discouraging 
exit. 
 By voice, I mean that that the individual or entity complying with an 
antidiscrimination law can actively express its disagreement with the implicit 
message of such a law—e.g., the message that sexual orientation is a morally 
neutral characteristic and that discrimination on that basis is wrong. The voice in 
this situation is the voice of dissent. The second option—exit—can take multiple 
forms. It may result in civil disobedience or in withdrawal from the activities 
being regulated, as when Catholic adoption agencies have ceased providing 
services to government agencies rather than comply with an antidiscrimination 
law. 
 In effect, the consequence of treating civil obedience as non-expressive is 
to allocate the burden of dissent (or exit) onto the civil rights objector. Ironically, 
the burden and right of dissent, should the party exercise it, constitutes a form of 
coming out—in this instance coming out as an objector to the antidiscrimination 
message embodied in a majoritarian law.  
108 Id. at 2780–82. 
109 Id. at 2783. 
                                                 
 Consider the subtle but important difference that this allocation of burden 
would have made in GRC. What actually occurred, after the litigation ended, was 
that the gay student groups agreed to include statements in their publications that 
the University did not endorse the positive views toward homosexuality that the 
student group communicated. There is a whiff of shaming in this result. By 
contrast, had the University stated in relevant materials that it did not endorse the 
views of the gay student groups (or, more appropriately, of any student groups), 
the implicit positioning would have signaled that Georgetown was the entity that 
needed to dissent, that antidiscrimination was the norm. Requiring Georgetown to 
state its own position would not have disrespected that position, but it would have 
aligned the remedy with the fact that the D.C. antidiscrimination statute had 
shifted the baseline norm. 
There are other advantages to structuring a remedy that allocates the 
burden to dissent in this way. It furthers an important goal of pluralist governance, 
which is to enliven the diversity of viewpoints available in the culture. Rather 
than suppress opposition to an antidiscrimination mandate, such a remedy 
facilitates it.  
One may object that pressuring an organizational or institutional dissenter 
to express its views more publicly could have the disadvantage of making internal 
change slower and more difficult. If an institutional dissenter is forced to dig in its 
heels and defend its opposition to a civil rights law, the ideological diversity 
within the group may diminish, leading to less willingness to change. While I 
acknowledge this risk, it seems to me that a mark of greater respect for the 
dissenter’s position is to allow such change to occur, or not, against the backdrop 
of greater transparency of the views being espoused.    
The compromise result that the GRC court fashioned is understandable, 
given the appropriate desire to preserve the dignity of both parties. But there is a 
better and more focused principle than minimalism or pluralism for courts to use 
as guidance: the goal of fostering voice and discouraging exit.  
  
C. Protecting Dissent 
 
 The final component of the adjudicatory principles that I offer here can be 
stated simply: together with a goal of enhancing dissent and discouraging exit 
comes the concomitant responsibility of courts to protect the right of dissent to 
which objectors are entitled.  When popular opinion is changing, the pressure to 
conform to suddenly reversed norms can be harsh. 
  In Okwedy v. Molinari,110 for example, the Second Circuit correctly 
accorded scope for dissent from antidiscrimination norms. In that case, a church 
had contracted with a commercial vendor of billboard space to display a Bible 
verse condemning homosexuality in Staten Island, New York. Soon after the 
billboards were posted, the vendor received a letter from the Borough President 
stating that the display “conveys an atmosphere of intolerance which is not 
welcome in our borough . . . [P]lease contact . . . my legal counsel . . . to discuss 
further the issues I have raised in this letter.”111 The vendor removed the signs. 
 When the church and its pastor sued, the district court dismissed their First 
Amendment claims on the grounds that the Borough President did not have 
regulatory authority over the vendor and that his letter merely called for dialogue 
rather than threatening economic retribution.112 The Second Circuit reversed, 
finding a sufficient basis for inferring threats by a public official, even if not of 
official power, to require that the claims be reinstated.113   
 A situation such as the use of public billboards presents the easiest case 
for recognizing the importance of the First Amendment rights of those who 
oppose LGBT equality, because it raises no problems of captive or susceptible 
audiences or the potential for workplace disruption. Even in situations in which 
those other concerns are present, however, courts need to exercise special care to 
ensure that enforcement of antidiscrimination laws and norms does not silence the 
voices of those who disagree. 
 In Good News Employee Association v. Hicks, members of an employee 
group posted notices in the workplace describing the organization as “a forum for 
people of Faith to express their views on . . . . the Natural Family, Marriage and 
Family values [sic].” 114 The employer, a public agency, removed the flyers on the 
ground that the language was homophobic and could promote harassment based 
on sexual orientation, a result upheld by the trial and appellate courts. The district 
court acknowledged that this was a close case: on the one hand, the employer had 
110 333 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 2003). 
111 Id. at 342. 
112 Okwedy v. Molinari, 150 F. Supp.2d 508, 518 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
113 333 F.3d at 343. 
114 2005 WL 351743 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2005), aff’d, 223 Fed. App’x 734 (9th Cir. 2007). 
                                                 
 an independent right to prevent disruption in the workplace and there had been a 
complaint; on the other hand, the language was not inflammatory and only one 
complaint had been filed.115 On balance, the court found that group had only a de 
minimis protectable right to post messages when regulation of the system 
properly lay in the employer’s discretion. 
 In my view, this was too narrow a view of the rights of the conservative 
employees’ group. The language of its flyer was too mild, and the principle of 
protecting dissent too important, to justify the removal. Although the context was 
a workplace, where other employees are to some extent a captive audience, a flyer 
on a bulletin board is not difficult to ignore, and there was no evidence that the 
group’s message was targeted to specific individuals. 
 The school T-shirt cases present the most difficult situations to assess, 
because the context involves minors and schools’ appropriate desire to insulate 
them from messages that might impair the learning environment even without 
causing measurable disruption. There is no easy way to distinguish between 
“homosexuality is shameful,”116 “straight pride,”117 and “be happy, not gay.”118 
As Judge Posner noted, derogatory comments about “a sexual orientation that 
deviates from the norm . . . can strike a person at the core of his being [, 
especially] adolescent students.”119 On that basis, one can distinguish reasonable 
policies by school officials that suppress speech that, in a different context, would 
be entitled to First Amendment protection. 
 
D. Summary  
 
 In sum, this Part argues for an alternative to supplement the privileging of 
judicial minimalism as a mechanism for enhancing cultural pluralism.  A three-
part set of interpretive devices—treating civil obedience as non-expressive, 
allocating the burden of dissent from the message of antidiscrimination laws to 
115 2005 WL 351743 at *2–9. 
116 Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1100 (S.D. Cal. 
2004), aff’d, 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), reh’g denied, 455 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc). 
117 Chambers v. Babbitt, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1070 (D. Minn. 2001). 
118 Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). 
119 See id. at 671. 
                                                 
those who object to those laws, and stringently protecting those rights to dissent—
will preserve dignity rights on both sides while better aligning with the goal of 
achieving equality.  These interpretive principles should form part of pluralist 
jurisprudence. 
 
V. CIVIL RIGHTS MORALISM 
 
Because both sexuality and religious liberty are so morally charged, so 
intrinsically infused with normative constructs, disputes in which the two sets of 
rights are pitted against each other are especially revealing of fissures in the 
meaning of antidiscrimination law.  On one hand, this branch of law is treated as a 
viewpoint-neutral regulatory mechanism for equalizing opportunity in economic 
markets and civil society.  On the other hand, more informally but with 
comparable frequency, courts describe antidiscrimination law in openly 
expressive and specifically moralistic terms. When antidiscrimination law covers 
a form of stigmatized sexuality, the two cultural meanings of this type of law 
clash, sometimes in rhetorically violent terms.  
The idea of racial equality has become a core principle in the American 
narrative of progress, embedded alongside the belief that whatever can be 
correctly categorized as racist behavior is intrinsically morally wrong. The origins 
of what I would call civil rights moralism are understandable, and even noble.  
The civil rights movement for racial equality, especially as it emerged in 
the South, steadfastly linked itself to a broadly envisioned concept of Christian 
ethics, amplified by the prophetic traditions within African-American 
Protestantism. Invoking “the Supreme Court, the Constitution, and God 
Almighty” as a seamless conjoined authority created a powerful message for the 
movement both externally and internally.120 The gestalt of civil rights organizing 
was “a part of the historical tradition of religious revivals as much as it [was] of 
the tradition of protest movements.”121 
120 See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Address to the Montgomery Improvement Association (Dec. 
5, 1955) (transcript available at http://mlk-
kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/encyclopedia/documentsentry/mia_mass_meeting_at_holt_street_ba
ptist_church/) (“If we are wrong, the Supreme Court of this nation is wrong. If we are wrong, the 
Constitution of the United States is wrong. And if we are wrong, God Almighty is wrong.”).  
121 DAVID L. CHAPPELL, A STONE OF HOPE: PROPHETIC RELIGION AND THE DEATH OF JIM CROW 
87 (2004). 
                                                 
 Throughout the 1950s, movement leaders prioritized securing a 
presidential imprimatur for an explicitly moral framing of the issue.122 When 
President Kennedy declared in 1963 that the question of integration forced the 
nation to confront “a moral issue . . . [that] is as old as the Scriptures and . . . as 
clear as the American Constitution,” movement leaders celebrated the speech as 
an enormous breakthrough, not only in their public statements but in their private 
communications as well.123 
Yet that framing leads directly to its own reaction.  Religious 
conservatives argue that a sincere belief in the moral evil of homosexuality could 
not possibly constitute a civil rights violation in a universe of meanings in which a 
violation of civil rights is itself morally wrong. To the observant adherent of 
traditionalist conservative Christianity or the other western faiths, both could not 
be true.124 The dilemma of civil rights moralism arises from disbelief that 
condemnation of evil can encompass both the wrong of bigotry and the wrong of 
homosexuality.  
For some religious conservatives, the possibility that Bob Jones could be 
applied in a LGBT equality context as the GRC panel did – to forbid a religious 
institution from engaging in a practice that is core to its faith – leads the parade of 
horribles to be feared from the acceptance of marriage equality.125 The most 
common rejoinder—that Bob Jones is an outlier decision unlikely to be applied 
outside the context of race—fails to grapple with what a future court could 
plausibly do.126 
122 See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-1963 213 
(1988); DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE SOUTHERN 
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 119 (1986). 
123 BRANCH, supra note 125, at 823–24; GARROW, supra note 125, at 269. 
124 See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, The Moral Rhetoric of Legislation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 992, 997–
1007 (1997); Peter M. Cicchino et al., Comment: Sex, Lies and Civil Rights: A Critical History of 
the Massachusetts Gay Civil Rights Bill, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 549, 611–15 (1991); 
Developments in the Law – Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1568, 1628–29 
(1996) (describing state laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation that also 
specifically disavowed legislative condoning of homosexuality). 
125 Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., The Terms of Our Surrender, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2014, at SR12. 
126 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF 
RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 339 (2010) (denial of tax exemption because of sexual orientation 
discrimination would be “unthinkable”). For an argument that Bob Jones should be extended to 
cover discrimination against women, see Caroline Mala Corbin, Expanding the Bob Jones 
                                                 
In the LGBT equality cases that have come before the Supreme Court, 
Justice Scalia’s opinions epitomize both the morality-inflected arguments at issue 
in these disputes and the emotional defensiveness that they trigger. The 
foundational premise of his opinions is the refusal to accept the equivalence of 
sexual orientation discrimination and race discrimination, reasoning that the latter 
is properly aligned with bigotry, while the former represents healthy majoritarian 
interpretations of morality. 
In the first of a series of dissenting opinions in LGBT equality cases, 
Justice Scalia nailed the point: whether “the proposition that opposition to 
homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias” is “precisely the 
cultural debate” that arises in disputes over LGBT equality laws.127 He rejected 
the majority’s ruling that a provision of the Colorado state constitution adopted by 
voters reflected animus toward lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men, as if 
“‘animosity’ toward homosexuality is evil” or “somehow un-American.”128 In his 
view, Colorado’s anti-gay law reflected merely a different form of morality, not 
an inferior form. To Justice Scalia, support for a discriminatory law rested on the 
time-honored belief that “homosexuality is morally wrong and socially harmful” 
and on merit worthy efforts to defend “traditional American moral values”129 and 
“prevent piecemeal deterioration of majoritarian sexual morality.”130 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in United States v. Windsor131 uses language even 
more saturated with alarm over losing a claim to the moralist high ground. At 
issue in Windsor was a constitutional challenge to the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), which forbade the federal government from recognizing lawful same-
sex marriages. Scalia chastised the majority opinion for celebrating “how superior 
the majority’s moral judgment in favor of same-sex marriage is to Congress’s 
‘hateful’ moral judgment against it.”132 He railed against the ways in which 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court found a “‘bare desire to harm’” or 
Compromise, in  LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES : 
ACCOMMODATION AND ITS LEGAL LIMITS 123 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012). 
127 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis removed). 
128 Id. at 643, 644 (internal citations omitted). 
129 Id. at 645, 651. 
130 Id. at 653.  
131 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013). 
132 Id. at 2709. 
                                                                                                                                     
 “malice” toward same-sex couples in DOMA’s legislative history.133 The primary 
thread of his dissent is that those who oppose homosexuality or marriage equality 
are morally good persons holding morally legitimate views, and not the 
caricatures he accused the majority of suggesting: “those with hateful hearts,”134 
“unhinged monsters of a wild-eyed lynch mob,”135 “enemies of the human 
race”136 and “of human decency,”137 and, simply, “monsters.”138 Justice Scalia 
returned to what he had identified in Romer as the heart of a civil rights claim: 
whether the law’s differential treatment was based on a morally unworthy 
prejudice, equivalent to racial or religious bias. 
Justice Scalia’s emotionalism and hyperbole may seem extreme, but he is 
not alone. Some scholars have endorsed his interpretation.139 These critics are on 
target in recognizing that the j’accuse effect of antidiscrimination claims itself 
constitutes a significant source of cultural power.  Understandably, civil rights 
advocates may resist any weakening of this significant cultural tool. But, just as it 
is often difficult in the United States to disaggregate religious teachings from non-
sectarian ethical values in the context of sex, it is challenging—but necessary—to 
distinguish moralism from the social goods and norms embedded in the equality 
principle. 
Consistent with the principle that civil obedience must be interpreted as 
neutrality under the law, courts faced with normative disputes in civil rights cases 
should resist the temptation to engage in moralistic reasoning. Revisiting and 
revising the cultural discourse of antidiscrimination law is important for at least 
three reasons.  First, to do so would lower the intensity of various cultural 
divisions and thus contribute to a sense of social cohesion.  Second, subtracting 
133 Id. at 2707–09. 
134 Id. at 2707. 
135 Id. at 2708. 
136 Id. at 2709. 
137 Id. at 2710. 
138 Id. at 2711. 
139 See generally Michael J. Perry, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Why Excluding Same-Sex 
Couples from Civil Marriage Violates the Constitutional Law of the United States (Emory Univ. 
Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 14-269, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2352516; Steven D. Smith, The Jurisprudence of  Denigration (Univ. of 
San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 14-143, 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2407244. 
                                                 
religious moralism from civil rights arguments would benefit those whose 
equality claims are most likely to encounter resistance from traditional religious 
spheres, especially women and sexual minorities.140 Ironically, unless 
antidiscrimination is viewed as more of a transactional mandate and less of a 
moralistic command, it will continue its position as the legal glove that does not 
fit for sex and gender claims.  Lastly, the search for individual animus has 
contributed to rendering antidiscrimination law as less useful for attacking 
structural hierarchies rather than episodic bad actors. Substituting a robust 
conceptualization of structural discrimination for the search for individual animus 
would strengthen, rather than weaken, the ethical foundations of a commitment to 
civil rights. 
 
VI. PLURALISMS 
  
 Some disputes strain the capacity of law to produce reasoned conclusions.  
There is a widespread belief that pluralism is the best response.  When society is 
sharply divided over what constitutes moral goods, the legal system ideally serves 
to maintain social order and facilitate social integration, performing an essential 
defensive function in the face of culture wars. Concepts of pluralism furnish the 
lodestar for that effort. With that safety valve in place, modern liberal 
democracies can encourage creative tension among the state, civil society and 
religious institutions as generators of moral values and beliefs. The trick is to 
maintain the magic mixture of competition and harmony, an equilibrium that will 
protect minority views and values from destruction if not extinction.                      
The normative punch of pluralism lies in its ethical imperative to respect 
competing viewpoints and to recognize that incompatible values may be held by 
persons presumed by the law to be equally rational.  The Religion Clauses 
represent the response of the Framers to this tension: a prohibition on the state 
from “sending a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents 
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.”141  
140 Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 
781, 782 (2007). 
141 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
                                                 
 What pluralism is to governance, tolerance is to culture.  Tolerance, many 
believe, offers a repository of universal and neutral values that can be marshaled 
as aids in the peaceful adjudication of competing moral claims.  Law as its own 
cultural realm has generated principles of adjudication that embody tolerance and 
pluralism, chief among them the techniques of judicial restraint.  The great appeal 
of minimalism as a pluralism-driven technique for adjudication—of “leaving 
things undecided” —is its facilitation of more time and cultural space for the 
informal evolution of views on divisive questions. 
Yet the shortcomings of pluralism and tolerance are also well-
rehearsed.142 While protecting a stigmatized minority from violence (either 
juridical or physical), reliance on tolerance as an approach to social conflict 
simultaneously reinforces the status quo of hierarchical power relationships. The 
more powerful group need only tolerate the less powerful, and the latter group 
must make do as best it can with something less than equality or redress. A 
regime of tolerance acts as a kind of mandate for formal equality, but nothing 
more, in the allocation of access to discursive space. 
Judge Mack’s opinion in GRC exemplifies cultural tolerance and 
pluralistic judging.  Its genius was the defusing of two seemingly irreconcilable 
conscience-based positions, framed as the conflict between equality and religious 
expression. The court succeeded in enforcing the D.C. Human Rights Law while 
simultaneously treating the claims of the two opposing norm-driven entities as 
equally entitled to respect.  In so doing, it successfully shifted the shape of the 
dispute from narrow and deep to narrow and shallow, deploying a jurisprudence 
of minimalism in the service of the politics of pluralism.  
The decision has served well as a bridge from a time in which only a tiny 
fraction of jurisdictions permitted an antidiscrimination claim based on sexual 
orientation to the present. Its compromise resolution was useful in warding off 
premature closure of a values debate that continues today, and it bought time for 
public opinion to evolve. Following an initial period of backlash after the 
decision,143 Georgetown has become a leader among Catholic universities in its 
142 See generally WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY 
AND EMPIRE 14–20 (2006); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist 
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. at 393–94. 
143 After the University declined to seek Supreme Court review of the en banc court’s decision, 
Congress amended the D. C. Human Rights Act to create an exemption for religious universities 
                                                 
support of openly LGBT students.144 It has established an LGBTQ Resource 
Center on campus, where the annual award for an outstanding graduating law 
student is named for the individual who led the plaintiff organization in GRC.145   
Other Catholic universities have begun to provide similar services.146 
The GRC decision did not, however, produce constitutional clarity on the 
critical and lingering question of whether the exclusion of certain persons can be 
justified as necessary for an entity to communicate its own ideas and self-identity. 
The singular nature of its resolution—the court’s split remedy distinguishing 
between symbolic and material benefits—limited the precedential impact of the 
decision. No court of last resort since has cited GRC as determinative. 
This Part argues that “pluralism” is best understood as a question, not an 
answer, in the equality versus religious expression debates. The meaning of 
pluralism lies in the mind of the beholder. To say that fostering pluralism is the 
wisest governance model for dealing with diametrically opposite, intensely held 
beliefs only begs the question of which version of pluralism one supports.  
I identify two models of pluralism relevant to the context of disputes 
between equality rights and religious expression rights, distinguished by how each 
would structure the role of the state. I argue that in a modern democracy, the state 
must act as the umpire, not merely as a player, in its implementation of pluralist 
principles. I close by identifying an example of nested pluralism that is  hiding in 
plain sight in the gay rights versus religious expression debate: the changing 
content of religious beliefs. 
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 A. The State as Player  
 
 Beyond the most generic values associated with tolerance, pluralism itself 
is a contested concept. The decision in GRC, for example, has been both 
celebrated and condemned in the name of pluralism.147 Such conflicting reactions, 
claiming the same rationale for opposite conclusions, flow from the fact that 
pluralism—perhaps because of its “mother and apple pie” appeal in a society that 
craves less political polarization—has been appropriated to mean two very 
different systems. 
 Consider the Biblical injunction to “render unto Caesar the things that are 
Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s.”148 One can read that simple 
sentence as implying a sequence or priority: one’s obligations as a citizen come 
first and loom largest, but always with the reservation of core conscience-driven 
duties toward a deity. Or, it can be read as two equivalent commands.  
 Proponents of the widest scope of Free Exercise protections endorse the 
second reading. Under this model of pluralism, the state is one contestant among 
many, proffering one claim among many as a source of moral authority. Like any 
interest group, the state constitutes one faction, and must itself operate under a 
rule of mutual tolerance.  
 
 Michael McConnell is the leading scholar and advocate of what he calls 
“the new American philosophy of religious pluralism.”149 His work best 
exemplifies this privatist claim to pluralism: the argument that citizens owe no 
more to Caesar than to God, indeed probably a great deal less: 
At its very core, the Free Exercise Clause . . . 
reflected a theological position: that God is 
sovereign. It also reflected a political theory: that 
government is a subordinate association . . . To 
recognize the sovereignty of God is to recognize a 
plurality of authorities and to impress upon 
147 See, e.g., Eskridge and Peller, supra note 4; Eskridge, supra note 4; Walsh, supra note 25, at 
561. 
148 Matthew 22:21. 
149 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1513 (1990). 
                                                 
government the need for humility and restraint . . . 
[T]he government has an obligation to defer, where 
possible, to the dictates of religious conscience . . 
.150 
Another related component of the state-as-player model is an understanding that 
religious commandments are equivalent to secular laws: “The Free Exercise 
Clause does not protect autonomy; it protects obligation…The Free Exercise 
Clause does not protect the freedom of self-determination . . . ; it does protect the 
freedom to act in accordance with the dictates of religion, as the believer 
understands them.”151 
 On this understanding, God is sovereign, the individual is a subject of 
God, and the state poses a dangerous threat to the individual’s ability to carry out 
her religious duties. A “pluralistic republic” exists when “citizens are free to 
exercise their religious differences without hindrance from the state.”152 The 
“pluralistic philosophy of the Religion Clauses” mandates that “the state must 
create exceptions to laws of general applicability when these laws threaten the 
religious convictions or practices of religious institutions or individuals.”153 
Institutions of state power—such as courts and legislatures—should create carve-
outs that can sustain the principle of equal moral authority on as many political 
and social issues as possible. 
 To adherents of the state-as-player model, the remedy that Georgetown 
won in GRC—merely the discretion to withhold what could be perceived as 
endorsement of the gay student group—constituted a defeat for religious 
autonomy. Indeed, this particular resolution of the case had been acceptable to the 
plaintiffs from the beginning of the lawsuit.154 Moreover, the role of the state—
with its compelling interest in eliminating sexual orientation discrimination—
occupied too much normative space. 
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  If the state is merely one contestant, it then makes perfect sense that 
antidiscrimination laws that make sexual orientation a protected characteristic 
would themselves amount to discrimination. Their enforcement creates a burden 
that has a disparate impact on religious entities that oppose equal treatment based 
on sexual orientation. This, then, is the pluralist attack on the GRC court’s 
pluralism. 
 
B. The State as Umpire 
 
 The second model of pluralism casts the state as umpire, the incontestable 
and final source of authority in a constitutional democracy. Protection for 
religious freedom flows from the mandate on the state to remain neutral as 
between religions and between religion and non-religion. Debates over what 
constitutes genuine neutrality center on the scope of the Establishment Clause: if 
the neutrality principle forces the government to dispense aid, for example, to 
religious institutions to the same extent as to sectarian institutions, it then runs up 
against the principle forbidding the advancement of and entanglement with 
religion.155 
There is some truth to the criticism that in state-as-umpire pluralism, the 
implicit foundation is that of secular dominance, since the state is a secular force. 
Benjamin Berger has characterized the conflict between law and religion as a 
cross-cultural encounter, and argued “law always vindicates its own cultural 
understandings.”156 Ultimately, any tolerance is by the state, of religion. For the 
state-as-umpire model, this reality is not only inevitable, but appropriate. The 
process of weighing and then comparing the level of harm to different groups 
from a particular policy, after all, requires someone to determine and enforce the 
result. 
This second model, with which I agree, is grounded in the belief that 
achieving any common ground in a cosmopolitan modern state requires a “secular 
public moral order.”157 Pluralist democracy, as William Eskridge has noted, is 
155 For example, the debate between the majority and the dissent in Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819 
(1995). 
156 Benjamin L. Berger, The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance, in AFTER PLURALISM: 
REIMAGINING RELIGIOUS ENGAGEMENT 99, 108 (Courtney Bender and Pamela Edith Klassen ed., 
2010). 
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fragile both because its viability is contingent on agreement among diverse and 
adversarial groups to abide by the processes of law and because the number of 
identity groups—and thus the level of intensity of inter-group conflict—is 
constantly increasing.158 
 Where the first model of pluralism would privilege private individual 
practices and understandings, the state-as-umpire second model is intrinsically 
committed to a public culture of much broader scope. It shrinks the space for 
carve-outs from generally applicable laws to that which captures infringements 
that are not justifiable because of the disproportionality of the harm that they 
impose as compared to the benefit that accrues from universal enforcement. 
Certainly Bob Jones would have been decided differently had the first model of 
pluralism been the Court’s operative philosophy.  
In addition, situations such as that in GRC when an accommodationist 
exemption would deny rights or benefits to a third party require a state-as-umpire 
model in order to protect the status and material well-being of non-adherents. 
State-as-player model pluralism, however, is on the offensive, at least in 
the Supreme Court. The Court’s recent opinions concerning the scope of the 
ministerial exception to antidiscrimination liability159 and the viability of a RFRA 
claim by some for-profit corporations160 hint of an opening for the first model in 
its language suggesting autonomy from generally applicable laws for religious 
entities, although the holding was explicitly cabined to the facts of that case. 
Insofar as the issue of LGBT rights is concerned, these two models are well 
underway on a collision course that began with the decision in GRC. 
  
C. We Are All Pluralists Now 
 
What does the future hold? The LGBT equality versus religious liberty 
conflict will, increasingly likely, become one of the primary sites in which broad 
understandings of pluralism will be negotiated. As iterative resolutions of this 
conflict emerge, there will be recalibration of which sexual and religious norms 
are socially legible as majoritarian or dissenting, and which conceptions of 
158 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by 
Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L. J. 1279, 1294–95 (2005). 
159 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
160 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  
                                                 
 morality will acquire greater or lesser cultural power.  The role of religion in 
regulating sexuality has long been so central to its social function that the 
prospect of that role diminishing calls into question the defining aspects of 
religious authority in the United States. 
With public opinion rapidly shifting on the acceptability of marriage 
equality and other areas of LGBT equality, it is a safe bet that the social meaning 
of homosexuality will continue to change. But these will not be the only beliefs 
that will change. Religious beliefs are also social constructions, which themselves 
change and will continue to do so.161 It is a mistake to see public opinion 
regarding sexuality as the variable with religious belief as a constant. In fact, both 
are in motion. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
  
 In GRC, the D.C. Court of Appeals understood that its role was not to pick 
one moral vision over another, but to divide a realm of expressive space.  
Although the court declared that one side won the battle of symbols and the other 
side won the battle of material benefits, the question was always whether both 
would be forced to co-exist in the particular community of meanings that was 
Georgetown University. The ruling forced that co-existence, which was its 
greatest achievement. 
  In this article, I have probed the weaknesses of the decision and used my 
analysis as the platform for proposing changes enabling courts to better adjudicate 
disputes that arise at the point of conflict between LGBT equality claims and 
defenses based on religious expression. I have opposed those who seek a general 
right of exemption from antidiscrimination laws, but also suggested methods that 
will enhance the protections for dissent by those who oppose such laws. As these 
questions continue to arise, which they will, there are many lessons to be learned 
from the Georgetown case. 
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